This paper describes a methodology and a case study in formal verification. The case study is the SSCOP protocol, a member of the ATM adaptation layer whose main role is to perform a reliable data transfer over an unreliable communication medium. The methodology involves (i) simulation for initial debugging; (ii) partial-order abstraction that preserves the properties of interest and (iii) compositional verification of the properties at the abstract level using the PVS theorem prover. Steps (ii) and (iii) guarantee that the properties still hold on the whole (composed, concrete) system. The value of the approach lies in adapting and integrating several existing formal techniques into a new verification methodology that is able to deal with real case studies.
INTRODUCTION
Formal verification methods form a wide spectrum ranging from fully automatic model checking to purely interactive theorem proving. Yet, despite many success stories, it appears that most real, industrial systems are out of reach of current state-of-the art model checkers [1, 2, 3, 4] and theorem provers [5, 6, 7, 8] .
Indeed, model checking can only verify medium-sized systems. On the other hand, theorem proving is not limited in principle by the size, or even by the infinite nature of the system verified, but it is limited in practice by the amount of time, effort and skill that users may invest in a given verification effort.
To overcome these limits, combinations of model checking and theorem proving through abstraction and compositionality have been advocated [9] . One typical instance of this framework (among others) is the following [10] : first, the PVS theorem prover [8] is employed for building an abstract, finite-state version of the system, which preserves the properties of interest for verification. The theorem prover operates in a compositional manner, i.e. each component of the system is 'abstracted' individually, using little or no information about the other components. Then, the properties are verified at the abstract level using the SMV model checker [11] and, if the verification is successful, the properties hold at the concrete level as well.
In this paper we propose another manner of combining state-space exploration, abstraction, compositional reasoning and theorem proving, and report the application of the method to a real case study.
The case study is the SSCOP (Service Specific Connection Oriented Protocol) [12] . Among other uses, the protocol has been proposed as an alternative to TCP in datagram satellite networks [13] .
The SSCOP is a member of the ATM adaptation layer, whose main role is to adapt the unreliable services provided by the lower (physical) layer, to reliable connections and data transfer between two ends. The protocol provides its upper layers with services such as connection establishment and release, error reporting, flow control, using a sliding-window mechanism and secure data transfer, using selective retransmission of protocol data units (PDU). It is standardized in [12] , a document consisting of an informal natural-language description and a formal specification in SDL (Specification and Description Language).
The secure data transfer service consists of mechanisms for sending PDUs and detecting and retransmitting lost PDUs. It is a complex, infinite-state system that occupies 12 of the 46 pages of the specification [12] . It uses nine integer counters, two queues, two arrays and six lists, all potentially unbounded. The lists contain records with several fields, one of which is again a potentially unbounded list.
The main property verified concerns the secure data transfer service between the sender and the receiver's clients. It says that when the transmission ends, the sequence of messages delivered to the receiver's client equals the sequence that the sender's client requested to send. This property is achieved by selective retransmission of lost messages.
Another property that the protocol consistently enforces for efficiency reasons is that no data message is retransmitted unless it was really lost. However, there are two distinct (and distant) mechanisms for requesting retransmissions: one is controlled by the sender and the other one is controlled by the receiver. These two mechanisms have to co-operate in order to avoid useless retransmissions. This intricate behaviour makes the protocol a challenging case study for verification.
METHODOLOGY

Guided simulation
By examining the SDL specification it can be noted that the protocol does not satisfy its main property in all environments. This is confirmed by simulating the specification using the ObjectGeode tool [14] . For example, at any time during a data transmission, the upper layer may emit an 'abort transmission' signal, and then retrieve the messages received so far. Typically, this is only a subsequence of what has been sent, which violates the protocol's main property.
Hence, it is necessary to assume that some erroneous behaviours of the layers surrounding the protocol, which make the protocol violate its main property, do not occur. The rest of the methodology is employed to prove that excluding such behaviours is also sufficient for the protocol to satisfy its main property.
Partial-order abstraction
The second ingredient in our methodology is an abstraction that consists in considering some sequences of actions as atomic. This is a well-known technique used in finite-state model checking [15, 16, 17] . It is here adapted to the deductive verification of a class of safety properties on a class of infinite-state systems. Unlike other abstraction techniques such as predicate abstraction, e.g. [2, 10, 18] and many others, partial order-abstraction is an under-approximation and therefore it is not correct 'by construction' for safety properties. We prove that, under reasonable sufficient conditions, the abstraction is correct. This means that the properties verified at the abstract level will also hold at the concrete level. The sufficient conditions are well adapted for deductive verification (but not for model checking, as checking them may be as hard as checking the main properties of interest) and, to our best knowledge, they are original.
Compositional, deductive verification
For verifying invariants we use PVS [8] , a proof assistant based on typed higher-order logic. An automated PVS strategy is used, which attempts to prove that a predicate is inductive, i.e. true initially and preserved by every transition. If this is the case, the predicate is an invariant, otherwise, the subgoals left unproved by PVS suggest auxiliary invariants that, if proved, allow the initial goal to be proved. This technique, called invariant strengthening, has been proposed in [19] in the context of deductive protocol verification using PVS.
However, unlike [19] we perform invariant strengthening in a compositional manner: each entity (sender and receiver) requires its own set of auxiliary invariants, many of which, thanks again to the partial-order abstraction, are preserved by construction by the other entity and do not require a proof. This saves many proof obligations which, without abstraction, would have made the verification infeasible. The compositional rule is proved correct and, to our best knowledge, is also original.
Overall, we obtain a verification methodology for communicating systems, which integrates and adapts several existing verification techniques in a new and meaningful manner. The methodology is effective enough to sucessfully deal with medium-sized system like the SSCOP protocol. The case study took 3 months to complete. We believe this is a reasonable amount of time for verifying a real protocol.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a model of extended automata is defined, together with a method (similar to invariant strenghtening [19] ) for the verification of invariance properties using PVS. A simplification operation (called collapsing) is also defined, which transforms an extended automaton into a smaller, equivalent automaton that is typically easier to verify. Section 3 deals with the parallel composition of extended automata. Two parallel composition operations are defined: the interleaved composition is a usual asynchronous parallel composition; the atomic composition lets some particular sequences of transitions be executed atomically. It is shown that, under reasonable sufficient conditions, the verification of an interleaved parallel composition can be reduced to the (typically easier) verification of an atomic parallel composition.
Then, Section 4 provides a compositional rule for the atomic parallel composition. In conjunction with the simplification/ reduction techniques defined in the previous sections, the rule typically generates fewer proof obligations than the global invariant strenghtening process introduced in [19] .
The resulting methodology has been applied to the SSCOP protocol; the results on this case study are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and discusses related work. For better readability, all the proofs of the results in the paper have been placed in the Appendix.
MODELS
In this section the model of extended automata is presented (Section 2.1), together with a method implemented in PVS The distinction between stable and unstable locations is important for specification and verification purposes. Intuitively, a system may wait in stable locations for input from the environment; in contrast, unstable locations denote transitory states in which the system only performs internal actions and outputs. This distinction is also present in verification formalisms such as IF [20] . Also, most of the properties verified concern the values of the variables at stable locations.
The types of variables include scalar types (integers, enumerated types), and array types, which are functions from the integers to some scalar or other array type.
Notations and conventions
For a variable f of an array type, the expression f[e 1 ] [ e 2 is an abbreviation for f [ lk. if k ¼ e 1 then e 2 else f(k). Intuitively, this means that the new value of f is identical to the old one, except at position e 1 , where the value of e 2 is assigned. In the graphical representation of extended automata, variables that are not explicitly present in an assignment are assumed to be unmodified. EXAMPLE 1. The two automata depicted in Figure 1 describe a simple 'protocol' in which the sender S and receiver R exchanges values-via the R and L channels, modeled as shared array variables.
The automaton S represented in Figure 1 (a) has one location l 0 (which is initial and stable), five integer variables x, y, l r , l w , r w , and two array variables R and L. The latter are infinite arrays of integers, i.e. functions from integers to integers. The initial condition (not shown in Figure 1 ) sets all integer variables to 0. The array variables model potentially unbounded FIFO queues:
R models an output channel for the process S, which writes to R the value of x at position r w . L models an input channel for the process S, which reads from L at position l r , and places the result in variable y. This may happen only if l r < l w , i.e. if there is at least one element in the channel.
Another example of extended automaton is R, depicted in Figure 1 (b). This automaton has three locations, l
The initial location is l 0 0 ; it is the only stable location. The automaton has four integer variables z, r r , r w , l w (all set to 0 by the initial condition, not shown in the figure), and two array variables R and L modeling FIFO queues that play roles symmetrical to those in the automaton S, i.e. R models an input channel for R, and L models an output channel.
By composing the two automata according to the usual shared-variable parallel composition we obtain a simple protocol in which the sender S places the current value of its variable x on the R channel. The receiver R reads this sequence at the other end, and memorizes its reading in variable z, which may be incremented (on the transition from l Verifying an ATM Protocol 3 of 21
DEFINITION 2. (Contiguous sequence).
A sequence s : t 1 t 2 Á Á Á t n of transitions of an extended automaton E is contiguous if for all i ¼ 1, . . . , n À 1, the destination of t i equals the origin of t i+1 . A contiguous sequence s is denoted by s :
, where for all i ¼ 1, . . . n, the transition t i has the origin l i as origin and destination l i+1 .
DEFINITION 3. (Syntactical macro-step)
. A contiguous sequence s : l 1 ! t 1 l 2 Á Á Á l n ! t n l nþ1 of transitions of an extended automaton E is a syntactical macro-step if the locations l 1 and l n+1 are stable, and, for all j ¼ 2, . . . , n, the location l j is unstable.
For example, the automaton R depicted in Figure 1 has one stable location l 
Semantics
Consider an arbitrary extended automaton with variables For a transition t with assignments A and v a valuation of the variables, we let A(v) denote the valuation obtained by performing the assignments A on v; i.e. if A : (x [ e x ) x2V , then, for each x 2 V, A(v)(x) ¼ e x (v).
DEFINITION 4. (States, runs and invariants).
A state is a pair hl, vi where l is a location and v a valuation. The set of states is denoted by S. A state hl, vi 2 S is stable if l is a stable location. An initial state is a state whose location l is initial and whose valuation v satisfies the initial condition Q. The transition relation r t of a transition t with guard G and assignments A is the set of pairs of states (s, s 0 ) 2 S · S such that, if s ¼ hl, vi and s 0 ¼ hl 0 , vi 0 , then the origin of t is l, the destination of t is l 0 , the valuation v satisfies G, and the valuation v 0 equals A(v). The global transition relation of the automaton is r ¼ [ t2T r t . A run fragment of the automaton is a sequence of states r : s 1 ‚ s 2 ‚ . . . ‚ s n ðn 2 NÞ such that there exists a contiguous sequence of transitions t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t nÀ1 with (s i , s i+1 ) 2 r ti, for i ¼ 1, . . . , nÀ1. If the sequence s is is a syntactical macro-step (cf. Definition 3), we say that r is a semantical macro-step. A run is a run fragment that starts in an initial state. A state is reachable if it is the last state of some run. A predicate P on the states of the automaton E (also called a state predicate of E) is an invariant, denoted E &P, if P holds in every reachable state of E.
Proving invariants of extended automata using PVS
A transition t of an extended automaton E is said to preserve a predicate P if, by using only the hypothesis that P is true before the transition t, it can be inferred that P is true after t is fired. Formally, let the weakest precondition of P by t be f pre pre t ðPÞ : 8s 0 : r t ðs‚ s 0 Þ ) Pðs 0 Þ ð 1Þ
Then, the transition t preserves P if the implication P ) f pre pre t ðPÞ is valid. The predicate P is inductive if P holds in the initial states of E and it is preserved by each transition of E. If P is inductive, then P is an invariant, but the converse is not true. This is because the basic hypothesis that P is true before a transition is usually not enough to prove its preservation. Typically, the hypothesis P has to be strengthened using auxiliary predicates; we say that the transition t preserves P using the auxiliary predicate Q if, by assuming that P^Q is true before a transition t, it can be inferred that P is still true after t (formally, the implication ðP^QÞ ) f pre pre t ðPÞ is valid). It is not hard to show that, if Q is an invariant and all transitions of the system preserve P using Q (and P holds in the initial states of the system), then P is an invariant as well. In general, there is no automatic means for computing auxiliary invariant predicates Q, because in general the verification of invariants is undecidable.
Our heuristic method implemented in PVS assists the user in the process of discovering such auxiliary predicates. An ad hoc PVS proof strategy is employed, which is independent from the system and property under verification. If the strategy is successful, this means that the predicate P under proof is inductive, and in particular, that it is an invariant. But if the strategy fails, PVS presents the user with pending (unproved) subgoals, which suggest auxiliary predicates Q required for proving P 1 . Now, to prove that Q is an invariant may require another predicate R, and the process continues until all the predicates generated in this manner are proved invariant.
This invariant-strenghtening process was proposed in [19] in the context of verifying a data-link protocol using PVS. What is new in our approach is the combination of invariant-strenghtening with partial-order abstraction and with compositionality, which will be presented in the following sections. We first present a simple, yet useful operation that simplifies extended automata prior to verification. 1 A natural candidate for the auxiliary predicate Q is the predicatê t2T ðP ) f pre pre t ðPÞÞ. Our PVS strategy generates a PVS representation of this formula as a number of pending subgoals; typically, one subgoal for each transition t 2 T. The auxiliary predicate Q is obtained by taking the constraints on the pre-states from the generated subgoals.
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Simplifying extended automata: collapsing transitions
The collapsing operation amounts to encoding the effect of a contiguous sequence of transitions into one transition. It produces an automaton that typically has fewer unstable locations than the original one. The result is an equivalent automaton, which is typically easier to verify. Equivalence here means that stable predicates, defined below, are invariants of the collapsed automaton if and only if they are invariants of the original automaton.
Remember that each transition t has a guard, which is, syntactically speaking, a predicate on the variables, and a vector of assignments, which, syntactically, is a tuple of assignments (one assignment for each variable). At the semantic level, a guard can be seen as a function from valuations (of the variables) to the Booleans, and assignments can be seen as functions from valuations to valuations. By abuse of notation we shall sometimes identify the guard (resp. the assignments) of a transition with their respective semantic functional interpretations.
Hence, assignments can be composed as functions: for assignments A 1 , A 2 , the assignment A 2 * A 1 denotes the function that, to each valuation v of the variables, associates the valuation A 2 (A 1 (v)). Also, a guard G and an assignment A can be composed together, i.e. G * A denotes the function that associates, to each valuation v, the Boolean value G(A(v)). 
be a finite, contiguous sequence of transitions of an extended automaton E, and, for i ¼ 1, . . . , n, let the guard and assignments of t i be G i , A i . We define the transition t ¼ Collapse(s) as follows: the origin of t is l 1 ; its destination is l n+1 ; its guard is G 1(
, and its assignments are A n * A nÀ1
The composition operation * can be implemented using syntactic substitution: if A 1 is the assignment (x [ e x ) x2V and A 2 is the assignment x2V , where every occurrence of x in the right-hand side expression f x has been replaced by e x . Similarly, if G is a guard, then the guard G * A 1 is obtained by substituting, for every x 2 V, all the occurrences of x in G by the corresponding expression e x . Proposition 1 below says that the effect of the transition Collapse(s) is equivalent to that of s. There, denotes the composition of binary relations, defined as follows: DEFINITION 6. For a set X and two binary relations a, b X · X, the composition b a denotes the set fðx‚ yÞ 2 X · Xj9z 2 X:ðx‚ zÞ 2 a^ðz‚ yÞ 2 bg.
ÁÁÁl n ! t n l nþ1 be a finite, contiguous sequence of transitions of an extended automaton E.
Let r i denote the transition relation of the transition t i , for i ¼ 1, ... , n, and r denote the transition relation of the transition t ¼ Collapse(s). Then r ¼ r n r nÀ1 ÁÁÁ r 1 .
Proof. Cf. the Appendix.
We apply the collapsing operation to a finite subset of the automaton's syntactical macro-steps (cf. Definition 3). In general, an extended automaton may contain infinitely many syntactical macro-steps: when a syntactical macro-step contains an unstable location that belongs to a cycle of unstable locations in the graph of the automaton, then, by iterating the cycle, an infinite number of syntactical macrosteps can be generated.
(Maximal syntactical macro-step). Asyntactical macro-step s is maximal if it does not contain a cycle of unstable locations, i.e. a contiguous subsequence s 0 :
For example, in the automaton R depicted in Figure 1 , the sequences of transitions l
are maximal syntactical macro-steps. On the other hand, e.g. by adding a self-looping transition t on location l 0 2 , the macro-
0 becomes non-maximal. This is because it is now a subsequence of (infinitely many) syntactical macro-steps, which are all obtained by iterating arbitrarily many times the self-looping transition t in l 0 2 . PROPOSITION 2. An extended automaton has finitely many maximal syntactical macro-steps.
The collapsing of an extended automaton E consists in collapsing the maximal syntactical macro-steps of E, leaving the rest of the automaton unchanged.
DEFINITION 8. (Collapsing an automaton)
. For E, an extended automaton, the extended automaton Collapse(E) is the smallest structure built as follows:
(i) the variables and initial condition of Collapse(E) are those of E; (ii) for each maximal syntactical macro step s : As maximal syntactical macro-steps are finitely many (cf. Proposition 2), the collapsing of an extended automaton can be performed algorithmically. Indeed, Step (ii) of Definition 8 involves a finite set of operations and Step (iii) reaches a fixpoint (i.e. it does not add any new transitions and locations to the resulting automaton) after finitely many operations. For example, for the automaton R depicted in Figure 1 , the automaton Collapse(R) is depicted in Figure 2 .
The main property of collapsing is that it preserves reachability of stable states:
PROPOSITION 3. Let E be an extended automaton. Then, a stable state is reachable in E if and only if it is also reachable in Collapse(E).
Stable predicates
Most of the verification techniques defined in this paper are tailored to the class of stable predicates, defined below. Intuitively, the truth value of such a predicate is only relevant in the stable states of a system, but it is trivially true in the unstable states. In the sequel, we assume that extended automata have a dedicated variable pc ranging over locations; hence, for l a location of the automaton, pc ¼ l is a predicate denoting the fact that control is currently at location l.
DEFINITION 9.
A state predicate P of an extended automaton E is stable if P is of the form (pc ¼ l) ) P 0 , where l is a stable location and P 0 is a state predicate.
Then, proving the invariance of a stable predicate on an extended automaton is equivalent to (but, typically, easier than) proving it on the corresponding collapsed automaton:
PROPOSITION 4. If P is a stable predicate of E, then CollapseðEÞ &P iff E &P.
It turns out that the invariant-strengthening process described in Section 2.2 typically generates auxiliary proof obligations of the form Q : ðpc ¼ lÞ ) Q 0 , where pc ¼ l is a predicate characterising presence at location l and Q 0 is some state predicate. Collapsing reduces the number of locations and, consequently, the number of proof obligations. Hence, proving CollapseðRÞ &w is easier than proving R &w, and the benefits increase with the number of sequences that are collapsed.
COMPOSING EXTENDED AUTOMATA
The techniques presented so far allow us to verify systems modeled using one global extended automaton. However, many systems consists of several communicating entities, which are best modeled using parallel compositions of extended automata. Section 3.1 defines two parallel composition operations. The first one, interleaved parallel composition, is more realistic from a specification point of view; but the second one, atomic parallel composition, is more practical for verification. We prove in Section 3.2 that, under reasonable sufficient conditions, a property verified under the atomic parallel composition holds under the interleaved parallel composition.
It should be noted that in other application domains, such as hardware, neither of the above essentially asynchronous compositions is realistic. A different, synchronous composition is typically used there.
Interleaved and atomic parallel compositions
The interleaved parallel composition, denoted by k, is the usual asynchronous parallel composition of programs with shared variables. The atomic parallel composition, denoted by j , allows some particular sequences of steps to be executed atomically.
Interleaved parallel composition
The initial location of the interleaved parallel composition E 1 kE 2 is the set of pairs consisting of initial locations of E 1 and of E 2 , and the initial condition is the conjunction of those of E 1 , E 2 . A state s of the composed system is a pair (s 1 , s 2 ) of states of the components that agree on the values of the common variables. Formally, let v #V 0 denote the restriction of a valuation v to a subset V 0 V of variables. The states
, where V 1 , V 2 denote the sets of variables of E 1 ,E 2 . For a state s ¼ hl‚ vi, we denote by s 
and r 2 ðs 2 ‚ s 0 2 Þ holds, or s
and r 1 ðs 1 ‚ s 0 1 Þ holds, where r 1 (resp. r 2 ) is the transition relation of E 1 (resp. E 2 ).
Atomic parallel composition
The initial location, initial condition, and states of the atomic parallel composition E 1 jE 2 are defined just like for E 1 kE 2 . Remember that a (semantical) macro-step (cf. Definition 4) is a run fragment s 1 , . . . , s k , where
. , k such that l 1 and l k are stable and for j ¼ 2, . . . k À 1, l j is unstable. Let the atomic transition relation r 1 of A 1 (and similarly, r 2 for A 2 ) be the set of pairs of states (s, s 0 ) for which there exists a macro-step between s and s 0 . Then, the 
Interpretation
The atomic parallel composition allows one component to move by performing a whole macro-step, while the other component does not move. For example, remember that l 0 0 is the only stable location of the automaton R depicted in Figure 1 . Then, e.g. R may perform the sequences of transitions l
While convenient for verification purposes, the atomic parallel composition is not realistic for modeling distant communicating entities, because it cannot be reasonably assumed that one entity, at one end of the protocol, performs a potentially unbounded sequence of actions, while the entity at the other end does not move.
Abstraction: from interleaved to atomic composition
In this section we show that, under reasonable sufficient conditions, the verification of automata composed using the interleaved (k) parallel composition reduces to that of |-composed systems, which can be dealt with compositionally (cf. Section 4). First, a notion of independence between transitions of extended automata is defined, and sufficient conditions are given, which can be used in practice for establishing the independence of two transitions. The notion of independence is then generalized to extended automata, together with sufficient conditions for independence, and a heuristic for helping to establish the independence of extended automata that model communication protocols. We then show that, for mutually independent extended automata E 1 , E 2 and the class of stable predicates P (cf. s ! t 1 s 00 . If t 2 is independent from t 1 and t 1 is independent from t 2 in state s, we say that t 1 and t 2 are mutually independent in state s.
If t 2 is independent of t 1 in s, the execution of the sequence t 1 t 2 in s can be replaced by t 2 t 1 , which produces the same global effect. Similar properties [15, 16, 17 ] are used in model checkers [4, 20] to fight the state-space explosion problem. In our theorem-proving framework, independence of transitions is employed for reducing the number of auxiliary proof obligations required for proving a given property.
Proposition 5 below gives sufficient conditions for independence in reachable states of E 1 kE 2 . We use the following notations: let t be a transition of an extended automaton E, and A denote its vector of assignments ðx[e x Þ x2V ; we denote by rhs(A) the vector of expressions ðe x Þ x2V . For t 1 , t 2 two transitions of an automaton E and A 1 : ðx[e x Þ x2V , A 2 : ðx[f x Þ x2V their respective vectors of assignments, remember (cf. Section 2.3) that A 1 * A 2 denotes the assignments ðx[e x ðx/f x ÞÞ, whose right-hand sides e x have every occurrence of x replaced by f x . The equality of vectors of expressions, e.g. ðe x Þ x2V ¼ ðf x Þ x2V is an abbreviation for the set of equalities e x ¼ f x , for all x 2 V.
Finally, the dual pre of the weakest pre-condition f pre pre [cf. Equation (1) 
Conditions (i) and (ii) in the Proposition are undecidable for arbitrary extended automata, but we are here in a deductive verification framework, where the main properties of interest are also undecidable. Hence, Proposition 5 is useful in practice when the verification of conditions (i) and (ii) does not generate too much verification overhead. This works well when the invariants (1) and (2) hold 'by construction', (e.g. when the transitions t 1 , t 2 access disjoint sets of variables, or, in the case of communication protocols, when t 2 writes at one end of a channel while t 1 reads from the other end of the same channel). EXAMPLE 2. Consider the extended automata depicted in Figure 1 . We label the transitions as follows: We show using Property 2 that t 1 is independent of t 3 in all reachable states of SkR. The underlying reason is that t 1 writes at one end of the channel R, while t 3 reads from the same channel at the other end.
Hypothesis (2) is easy to check, as all the variables that are syntactically modified by t 1 (i.e. R, x and r w ) are syntactically not modified by t 3 , and reciprocally.
We now check Hypothesis (1). The guard of t 3 is G 3 : r r < r w . Then, we have pre t1 (G 3 ): r r r w .
It is not hard to check that the predicate r r r w is preserved by all the transitions of S (t 1 ‚ t 2 ) and of R (t 3 ‚ . . . ‚ t 6 ). Hence, this predicate [pre t 1 ðG 3 Þ] is also an invariant of SkR, which implies Hypothesis (1). Then, by Proposition 5, t 1 is independent of t 3 in all reachable states of SkR. It can be shown in a similar manner that t 6 is independent of t 2 ; the underlying reason is again that t 6 writes at one end of a a channel (here, L) while t 2 reads from the same channel at the other end.
On the other hand, t 1 is mutually independent with t 4 , t 5 , t 6 ; and t 2 is mutually independent with t 3 , t 4 , t 5 . These mutual independences are proved directly using a syntactical argument: the transitions operate on disjoint sets of variables.
Finally, t 3 is not independent of t 1 in the initial states (where r r ¼ r w ¼ 0): the sequence t 1 t 3 can be executed, but the sequence t 3 t 1 cannot, as the guard G 3 : r r < r w is false. DEFINITION 11. Let E 1 , E 2 be extended automata. We say E 1 is independent of E 2 if every syntactical macro-step s of E 1 can be decomposed as s ¼ s 0 · s 00 , such that (i) s 0 is either the empty sequence, or it consists of exactly one transition and (ii) s 00 is a (possibly empty) sequence of transitions t
i is independent of every transition t of E 2 , in every reachable state of E 1 kE 2 .
If E 1 is independent of E 2 and E 2 is independent of E 1 we say E 1 and E 2 are mutually independent.
Heuristic for proving independence
For communication protocols modeled by extended automata that communicate through uni-directional FIFO channels (which we model using array variables) such as the example depicted in Figure 1 , or the SSCOP protocol described in Section 5, the following decomposition s ¼ s 0 · s 00 of syntactical macro-steps (cf. Definition 11) can be tried: s 0 is empty, or it consists of one transition that performs an input from one channel, s 00 is an arbitrary sequence of internal actions and of outputs to the other channel.
Indeed, Definition 11 requires that every transition (except maybe the first one) of every syntactical macro-step of one component, to be independent of all the transitions of the other component; and internal actions and outputs typically satisfy this condition. Such heuristics are employed in, e.g. SDL state-exploration tools [14] , without any justification as to whether the resulting reduced state-space is correct. EXAMPLE 3. We show that the automata S and R are mutually independent using the above heuristic. The automata have only one stable location each, which corresponds to their respective initial location. With their transitions labeled t 1 . . . t 6 as in Example 2, S has two syntactical macro-steps, denoted by s
and R also has two syntactical macro-steps, s
. Consider the following decompositions of these sequences: 
Finally, for the class of stable predicates (cf. Definition 9), the verification on the interleaved parallel composition is equivalent to that on the atomic parallel composition, provided that the two automata are mutually independent: PROPOSTION 7. Let E 1 , E 2 be mutually independent extended automata and P a stable predicate of E 1 kE 2 . Then E 1 jE 2 &P holds if and only if E 1 kE 2 &P holds.
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COMPOSITIONAL VERIFICATION
In Section 3.2 it has been shown that, for stable invariants and mutually independent extended automata, it is enough to perform the verification on the abstract, atomic parallel composition for the invariants to hold on the interleaved parallel composition. In this section we provide a compositional rule for verifying invariants at the abstract level, and show that this rule can be combined with the collapsing operation defined in Section 2.3 for reducing the number of proof obligations. The compositional rule (cf. Proposition 4 below) says essentially that the |-composition of two automata satisfies a given invariant whenever the two automata, suitably modified, satisfy the invariant. The precise definition of modified automaton is given below.
DEFINITION 13. (Modified automaton)
. Let E be an extended automaton, P a state predicate of E, and L a set of locations of E. The modified automaton E inithP‚ Li is an automaton identical to E, except that its initial condition is P and its set of initial locations is L.
For example, for the automaton S depicted in Figure 1 , S inithx ! y‚ fl 0 gi has the same locations, variables and transitions as S; its set of stable locations is {l 0 }, which coincides here with that of S; and its initial condition is x ! y, whereas that of S is more restrictive.
PROPOSITION 8. (Compositional rule)
. Let E 1 , E 2 be extended automata over a common V set of variables 2 , and P a predicate on the states of E 1 jE 2 such that P holds in the initial states of
s denote the sets of stable locations of E 1 , E 2 , respectively.
Using the compositional rule
By Proposition 8, for proving that a state predicate P is an invariant of E 1 jE 2 , it is enough to prove that P holds initially in E 1 , E 2 , and that P is an invariant of E 1 init hP‚ L 1 s i and of E 2 init hP‚ L 2 s i. The latter being stand-alone components, the basic invariant-strengthening technique (cf. Section 2.2) can now be used. Again, the basic hypothesis that P is true before each transition is usually too weak, and the hypothesis has to be strengthened using auxiliary predicates suggested by PVS.
The difference to proving a stand-alone system is that proof obligations may 'travel' between components: an auxiliary invariant Q used for proving P on one component may also have to be proved preserved by the other. To see this, assume that we want to prove E 1 jE 2 &P using Proposition 8. This requires to prove E 1 init hP‚ L 1 s i &P; assume P is not inductive, and that PVS suggests an auxiliary invariant Q.
) then the compositional rule (Proposition 4) can be used to deduce E 1 j E 2 &P; thus, a proof that Q is preserved by E 2 has been saved. Second, a proof obligation which only involves variables that are not modified by a component are trivially preserved by that component. Formally, if Q is an auxiliary invariant that involves only variables not modified by
Again, a proof that Q is preserved by E 2 was saved.
For example, the data transfer of the SSCOP protocol is decomposed in five components (three for the sender, and two for the receiver, cf. Section 5). Its verification consisted in proving 233 invariants, out of which 47 needed to be proved only on one component out of five; and, among the remaining ones, many more required a proof only on two or three components. In a global verification, each of these invariants would have required a proof on the whole system, which would have generated many more auxiliary proof obligations and would have made the verification practically unfeasible.
Combining the compositional rule and the collapsing operation
We show that for stable predicates, the compositional rule (Prop. 8) can be equivalently applied to the collapsed 2 This hypothesis is required for the modified automata E 1 inithP; L 1 s i and E 2 inithP; L 2 s i to be well defined. It can always be assumed, if E 1 and E 2 had different sets of variables
Of course, some of the variables in V 2 will never be actually read or modified by E 1 (more precisely, they will have identity assignments), but formally this is not a problem.
Verifying an ATM Protocol 9 of 21 automata. The collapsing operation has been defined in Section 2.3. First, the following proposition says that the Collapse operation distributes over the j parallel composition:
Þ &P. Hence, the compositional rule (Proposition 8) says that, in order to prove E 1 jE 1 &P it is enough to show that P holds initially in Collapse(E 1 ) and in Collapse(E 2 ), and that
Hence, E 1 and E 2 can be collapsed prior to using the compositional rule. Our experience with the SSCOP protocol showed that this significantly reduces the number of proof obligations required to complete a proof. As any compositional approach, ours works best for weakly coupled components-like the sender and receiver in communication protocols-and is presumably less effective for more tightly synchronized systems such as hardware.
Summary: verification methodology
We now combine the results obtained in Sections 2-4 into the following verification methodology. Our goal is to establish E 1 kE 2 &P, for P a stable predicate of E 1 kE 2 . First, the automata are checked for mutual independence using Proposition 2 and/or simple syntactical arguments (i.e. the transitions access disjoint sets of variables). Then, the automata are collapsed, and PVS and the invariantstrengthening techniques described in Section 2.2 are used to establish that P holds initially in Collapse(E 1 ) and in Collapse(E 2 ), and that CollapseðE 1 ÞinithP‚ L 
VERIFYING THE SSCOP PROTOCOL
In this section the verification of the SSCOP protocol using the approach presented in the previous section is reported. Both the protocol and its verification are quite large ($1000 PVS lines for the specification, 2000 lines for the 233 theorems, and 23,000 PVS proof commands). They are here described very briefly; see [12, 21, 22] for more details on the system and its verification. We include a small part of the verification to illustrate how the method presented scales up to a real system.
The SSCOP protocol consists of a sender and a receiver that exchange PDUs through communication channels. Let SR designate the channel from the sender to the receiver, and RS the channel from receiver to sender (cf. Figure 3) . We here assume that the the initial connection between sender and receiver has been established (the connection process is not modeled here; see, e.g. [21] for the verification of this process by model checking). The sender and receiver are in their secure data transfer modes, which involve four kinds of PDUs.
DATA PDUs transit on the SR channel. They convey the actual data from sender to receiver. Each DATA PDU also carries a unique index number, POLL PDUs also transit on the SR channel. They are used by the sender to question the receiver on its status with regards to reception of DATA PDUs; STAT (status) PDUs transit on the RS channel. The receiver replies with a STAT to a POLL of the sender, by reporting a list of DATA PDU that are missing; USTAT (unsolicited status) PDUs also transit on the RS channel. They are similar to STAT, except that they are emitted spontaneously by the receiver, when a DATA PDU with a higher index number than expected is received, which means some DATA PDU were lost during the transmission.
The main property verified concerns an arbitrary sequence of messages to be transmitted between the sender and the receiver's clients. The property says that when transmission ends, the Indication and Request sequences are equal. As the channels are imperfect, the protocol achieves this through selective retransmissions of DATA PDUs, using a mechanism involving POLL, STAT and USTAT PDUs.
Moreover, the protocol does not satisfy this property in all environments. This can be noted by carefully examining the SDL specification [12] ; a simulation of the specification using the ObjectGeode tool [14] confirms this observation. Hypotheses on the behaviour of the upper and lower layer have to be made-see below. Note that the simulation only shows that the hypotheses are necessary; the rest of the verification amounts to proving that these 
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Hypotheses on surrounding layers
Some behaviours of the upper layer may make the protocol violate its main property. For example, the receiver's client may require disconnection, which causes the transmission to terminate early; when this happens, a state is entered where the incomplete sequence of data received so far may be retrieved by the receiver's client. This violates the protocol's main property.
ASSUMPTION 1. The upper layer does not disrupt an ongoing data transfer
Assumptions have to be made on the lower layer as well: the communication channels may only lose, but not create, duplicate, or reorder PDUs. For example, if a DATA PDU reaches the receiver with the same sequence number as one that was already received (duplication), then the protocol exits its data transfer mode and transmission is terminated. Similarly, if two DATA PDU are reordered, the arrival of the first one may trigger the retransmission of the second one; the latter then reaches the receiver, with the same consequence that the transmission is abruptly terminated and the state where the incomplete sequence of messages is retrieved by the receiver's client, again violating the protocol's main property.
ASSUMPTION 2. The lower layer may lose, but cannot create, duplicate or reorder PDUs
Finally, the protocol cannot tolerate any amount of losses. A timer expires when no PDUs have arrived for a certain amount of time, which abruptly terminates the transmission and violates the main property: ASSUMPTION 3. The connection is not broken because of too many lost PDUs
Formally modeling the protocol
The protocol is SSCOP [ SenderkReceiver, where k is the interleaved parallel composition (cf. Section 2). This is consistent with the semantics of the protocol originally expressed in SDL [12] , in which distant processes may interleave their actions. The lossy channels are modeled using shared array variables, just as in our running example (cf. Sections 2-4).
A brief description of the sender and receiver processes follows. Both processes can be decomposed into several components, which correspond to SDL 'transitions' in the specification [12] . An SDL transition is similar to our notion of macro-step: e.g. performing an input from a channel, followed by arbitrarily many internal actions and outputs to another channel.
The sender process consists of one component for sending DATA and POLL PDUs, another one for receiving USTAT and a third one for receiving STAT PDUs. According to the semantics of SDL, only one of these components can be executing at one time, while the others are waiting in stable locations. This is because all three components belong to the same process, which is assumed to be executing on one single processor. Thus, the sender is defined as the atomic composition Sender [ (DATA & POLL sender j USTAT receiver j STAT receiver). The receiver is modeled as the atomic composition of two components, Receiver [(DATA receiver j POLL receiver).
Verification: the main invariants
The protocol's main property is expressed using a stable predicate (cf. Definition 9), saying that whenever both sender and receiver are in their initial locations, the Indication and Request sequences are equal. To take advantage of the verification methodology presented in Section 4, the interleaved parallel composition has to be replaced by an atomic one. For this, the independence hypothesis of Sender and Receiver (cf. Definition 11) has to be satisfied. It is here checked using syntactical arguments and simple invariants, in a manner completely similar to what was described in Section 3.2 (cf. Examples 2 and 3) for the running example of the paper 3 . The system to be verified becomes DATA & POLL sender j USTAT receiver |STAT receiver |DATA receiver |POLL receiver).
This decomposes each proof in five independent parts, which are dealt with in a compositional manner as shown in Section 4.
Verifying one representative invariant
The most important auxiliary property in the whole verification process is that DATA PDUs are not retransmitted unless they were really lost. The mechanism for requesting retransmissions is distributed: the USTAT PDUs are spontaneously generated by the receiver, while STAT PDUs are generated by the receiver in response to a POLL PDU from the sender. These mechanisms have to interact while preserving the given auxiliary property.
To prove the property that DATA PDUs are not retransmitted unless they were really lost, one has to establish, among others: (i) Every DATA identified as lost by a STAT in the RS channel, is either lost, or will never be retransmitted.
In the remainder of the section, we show how to formalize and prove the property (i). The property is about STAT PDUs, which are generated by the POLL receiver component in response to a POLL PDU. The component (the smallest of all five in our system) is depicted, somewhat simplified for better understanding, in Figure 4 . Execution starts in the DataTransferReady location by receiving a POLL input, which carries two numerical values: mVTS and mVTPS. These values respectively denote the values of the sender's highest index of an DATA PDU, and the index of the POLL PDU at the time it was emitted.
The POLL is first checked for validity, which essentially means that its mVTS field is not less than VRH, the highest index of an DATA PDU that the receiver knows about. If the POLL is not valid, the receiver exits the data transfer mode, which is encoded here by going to the OutOfDtr location. An invariant of the system (data not shown) allows us to prove that this location is unreachable. The only stable locations for the POLL receiver component are DataTransferReady and OutOfDtr.
Then, VRH and the receiver's own copy of VTPS are updated from the mVTS and mVTPS fields of the POLL PDU, respectively; and the system starts building a new STAT PDU, to be emitted as a response to the received POLL. The STAT will contain an abstract view of the receiver's window, namely, a list of indices that encodes the empty slots (DATA not arrived, assumed to be lost) and full slots (containing an arrived DATA) in the receiver's window. The rest of the component is essentially the process of building this list vList. The result is that vList is a strictly increasing sequence of integers i 1 , i 2 , . . . with the property:
(ii) If j is even, then all indices in the interval ½i jþ1 ‚ i jþ2 Þ denote empty slots in the receiver's window.
The empty slots in the receiver's window are those in which expected messages did not arrive. Hence, the actual encoding of statement (i) in PVS is given in Figure 5 . Thus, we have to prove that the POLL receiver component, depicted in Figure 4 , preserves the invariant retrans_inv1 depicted in Figure 5 . By applying our PVS strategy for proving invariants (cf. Section 2.2) we obtain that, in order to prove the retrans_inv1 invariant, the auxiliary predicate depicted in Figure 6 should be proved invariant. Note that the latter is just the PVS encoding of the property (ii) above. Our dedicated PVS strategy is applied again, which suggests to prove the two predicates depicted in Figure 7 are invariants. The latter are inductive and are automatically proved by our strategy, which implies that the auxiliary predicate depicted in Figure 6 is an invariant, which in turn implies that the predicate depicted in Figure 5 is an invariant as well.
Discussion
The verification has only generated auxiliary invariants (cf. Figures 6 and 7 ) that are unstable according to Definition 9 (the only stable locations for the POLL receiver component are DataTransferReady and OutOfDtr). Unstable invariants are of the form (pc ¼ l) ) P 0 for an unstable location l, and have the advantage of not requiring a proof of preservation by the other component. That is, we do not need to prove that the sender preserves the predicates depicted in Figures 6 and  7 , because, intuitively, while the receiver is in an unstable location, the sender does not move. This saves not only two proofs, but potentially many more, because an invariance proof typically requires a whole tree of auxiliary invariants, whose width and depth cannot be anticipated beforehand. This is the advantage of having employed the partialorder based abstraction. However, the compositional rule (Proposition 8) still requires us to prove that one invariant: the one depicted in Figure 5 , is preserved by the sender of the Verifying an ATM Protocol 13 of 21 SSCOP. That branch is treated in a similar manner and is eventually solved as well.
CONCLUSION AND RELATED WORK
We describe a methodology based on mechanized compositional and deductive reasoning, and illustrate it by verifying safety properties of the SSCOP protocol. The protocol is decomposed into 'components' that correspond to the transitions of its standard specification [12] expressed in the SDL language.
The verification is compositional in that each component has to ensure only the properties that concern it. The number of proof obligations is kept low thanks to the so-called partial-order abstraction.
The verification is deductive and makes intensive use of the PVS theorem prover. Starting with a set of predicates that constitute initial proof obligations, the user is assisted by PVS in discovering more properties of the protocol, which are indicated by the repeated failed attempts of PVS at proving the protocol correct. The supplementary properties constitute new proof obligations and enrich the user's knowledge of the protocol.
Each PVS proof consists of applying essentially the same automatic strategy, where the user only has to provide adequate quantifier instantiations and, in case the proof fails, to interpret the pending subgoals generated by PVS as new proof obligations. For the current case study, which is the core of a real communication protocol, the verification took 3 months (an additional month was spent for understanding the protocol and translating it to PVS). We believe this is reasonable, as the very definition of the protocol [12] also took several months. If the verification were done in parallel with the definition, this would not significantly increase the duration of the process and may even save time. Typically, the people in charge of proving the protocol acquire a very good understanding of it and can point to errors early in the design phase.
Related work
We present some of the numerous works related to each of the main techniques (partial-order-based, compositional and deductive verification) employed in this paper. We also mention the predicate abstraction-refinement technique, which is currently one of the most successful automatic technique for verifying real software. On the other hand, communication protocols have for a long time been a favourite application domain for the verification community; we here list some recent contributions involving relatively large case studies. Finally, we compare the present version of this work with the preliminary version [23] .
Partial-order-based verification
Ideas about partial-order abstractions go back as far as [24] , where parallel programs executing communication-closed layers (similar to our macro-steps) are considered. Equivalence of full interleaved executions and of executions in communication-closed layers is proved using a symmetrical independence relation.
Partial-order-based techniques have been also intensively studied and used by the model-checking community. The basic idea is that, if some transitions are independent, then not all their interleavings need to be explored for establishing their properties. This is employed in model checking for combating the state-space explosion problem. The approaches differ on the symmetrical or asymmetric nature of the independence relations employed, on the relative precision of the relation (i.e. which properties are preserved when independent transitions are reordered), and on the manner of incorporating the partial-order reductions in the modelchecking algorithms.
Historically, symmetrical independence relations (i.e. if t 1 is independent of t 2 , then t 2 is independent of t 1 as well) have been the first employed. The article [17] studies their fundamental properties. Applications to model checking with on-the-fly detection of independent transitions are presented in the monography [16] . The SPIN model checker [4] uses partial orders intensively, sometimes with dramatic effects on the reduction of the state-space explored. Asymmetric independence relations (t 1 may be independent of t 2 , but the converse may not necessarily be the case) have been introduced more recently [15] .
The independence relation that we employ in this paper (Definition 10) is asymmetric, and the sufficient conditions to establish it (Proposition 5) are undecidable. Hence, the relation is not well adapted to model checking, because, even in the finite-state case, model checking the sufficient conditions may be as complex as model checking the original properties of interest (i.e. the whole state-space of the parallel composition may need to be explored). On the other hand, the independence relation was well suited to the present theoremproving framework, because establishing it generated acceptable verification overhead (28 invariants automatically proved by our PVS strategy, compared to a total number of 233 invariants for the whole proof). It is expected that our approach works best for loosely coupled systems, for which establishing the independence relation is compensated by the gains resulting from the compositional partial-order verification.
The article [25] describes a theory for combining partialorder abstraction and deductive verification. The theory is deeply embedded in PVS, i.e. PVS is not only used for verifying specific systems, but also meta-level properties such as sufficient criteria for independence of parallel executions. In contrast, we prove these properties by hand and use PVS only to discharge proof obligations for the verification of specific systems. While their approach is more rigorous and involves more creativity with PVS, ours tends to involve the same basic routine with the prover. Compositionality is not an issue in [25] .
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Compositional verification
The reference monography [26] defines compositionality as the ability not only to verify, but also to build provably correct systems from their specifications. This is indeed a desirable goal. In this view, however, each component may only know the interfaces of the other components, but not their internal details. Hence, according to the above definition of compositionality, our approach is not compositional, and no verification method for proving properties involving internal variables of two different components is compositional either. Compositionality can also be seen in a broader sense, which can be summarized by the statement 'divide and conquer'. Other authors also adopt this view (e.g. [27] describes compositional verification using the SMV model checker; [28] present a compositional state-space generation for verifying finite-state systems). Another compositional model checking tool is the MOCHA tool [29] , which implements the assume-guarantee paradigm in a model-checking framework. Assume-guarantee is truly compositional in the sense of [26] .
Among the many verification techniques presented in [26] , ours is closest to the classical (also non-compositional in the sense of [26] ) method of Owicki and Gries [30] for shared-variable concurrent processes and properties. An important difference is that we provide a systematic method to obtain inductive invariants (which is the hardest part of the verification process). In contrast, the Owicki-Gries method assumes that all invariants provided by the user are inductive right from the start, and does not use abstractions to reduce the number of proof obligations. On the other hand, their method handles more general systems (i.e. that do not satisfy independence hypotheses) and also deal with other classes of properties, e.g. termination. A truly compositional verification method for systems with shared variables is the rely-guarantee approach [31] . Recent compositional approaches based on learning algorithms include [32, 33] .
Predicate abstraction-refinement
This is currently one of the most successful techniques for veryfying real software. It originates in the works of Graf and Saïdi [34] and has received sustained academic interest since then. It has been implemented in a variety of tools, including SLAM [2] and BLAST [35] , which have been quite successful at automatically verifying C code. This success is demonstrated by the fact that SLAM is the core verification engine in the Static Driver Verifier, part of the Microsoft Windows Driver Foundation, the development framework of device drivers for the omnipresent operating system.
The idea behind predicate abstraction is essentially to discover the relevant information (under the form of predicates on a program's data) that 'governs' the executions of the program. Automatic theorem-proving is used for building an abstract program, whose variables are all Booleans that keep track of the truth values of the chosen predicates. If the abstraction is too coarse, e.g. for proving a given safety property, new predicates (discovered by exploiting information from the counter-example to the safety property, provided by a model checker) are used to build a more precise abstract program. Although the process does not terminate in general, because of undecidability problem, it has been demonstrated to effectively terminate in many cases.
Conceptually, discovering adequate predicates for abstraction and discovering auxiliary inductive invariants (as in this work) is essentially the same thing: both use failures of earlier proof attempts for gaining new, useful information about the system. However, the automatic heuristics for abstraction refinement can only discover relatively simple predicates, unlike the complex invariants required for the present case study. It is reasonable to assume that really complex invariants can only be inferred by the user of a theorem prover, using both feedback from the prover and knowledge gradually gained while verifying the case study.
Verification of communication protocols
Relevant works in the deductive verification of communication protocols include [19, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40] . Deductive verification as a stand-alone technique is perceived, with good reason, as being time-consuming and requiring a lot of user expertise. It is, however, useful in combination with abstraction and model-checking techniques. The history of Phillips's Bounded Retransmission Protocol (a protocol fairly simpler than the SSCOP) is revealing for that matter: the initial deductive verification of the protocol [39] was performed in COQ [5] and took 3 months. The deductive verification of the same protocol with the more automated PVS system took 1 month [19] . Using the most recent features of abstraction and model checking in PVS [18] the protocol was automatically verified in a matter of seconds.
The automatic verification of protocols specified in SDL has also received some attention recently [41, 42, 43, 44] . These approaches are based on model checking, thus, they are subject to the usual limitations: some finite, usually 'small' instances (in terms of the size of buffers and communication channels) of 'large' case studies are verified. On the other hand, all these model-checking based techniques are fully automatic, unlike the combination of techniques presented in this paper, which rely on semi-automatic theorem proving. Compositionality and abstraction are also used to reduce a large state space to one amenable to model checking, but the corresponding reduction rules are not always formally justified. In [21] , the SSCOP protocol is model-checked for safety and liveness properties, under more restrictive In [23] an atomic sequence of transitions may access a shared variable (here, any of the communication channels) at most once, either in reading or in writing. Moreover, if the access is a reading it must occur at the beginning, and if it is a reading, it must occur at the end of the sequence. In the present paper, this definition is semantical-but for the case of communication channels, the definition amounts to the fact that an atomic sequence may (optionally) start with one input from one channel, followed by an arbitrary sequence of internal actions and outputs to the other channel.
The definition of atomic sequences in the present paper matches the notion of transition in the SDL language. Hence, in this paper we verify the SSCOP protocol in its precise SDL semantics, whereas in [23] , an over-aproximation of the semantics was used. Although over-approximation is sound for the class of safety properties, it did lead the proof into useless branches that were quite hard to comprehend because they refer to executions that do not exist to the actual SDL semantics.
Hence, if r 0 is the transition relation of the transition t 0 ¼ Collapse(s 0 ), then the equality ( ‡) : r 0 ¼ r nÀ1 Á Á Á r 1 holds. By construction, the guard of 
where l 1 is the origin of the transition t 1 and l n+1 is the destination of the transition t n . Let s 00 be the state hl n , v 00 i with v 00 ¼ A 0 (v), where l n is the destination of t nÀ1 . By Definition 5, l 1 is also the origin, and l n is the destination of t 0 ¼ Collapse(s 0 ). Then, 
The underlined items and Definition 6 imply (s, s 0 ) 2 r n r 0 , and the inclusion is proved.
() If (s, s 0 ) 2 r n r 0 , then, by Definition 6, there exists s 00 2 S such that (s, s 00 ) 2 r 0 , and (s 00 , s 0 ) 2 r n . From (s, s 00 ) 2 r 0 and (s 00 , s 0 ) 2 r n we obtain
Hence, s ¼ hl 1 , vi is such that its location l 1 is the origin of the transition t ¼ Collapse(s), and its the valuation v satisfies the guard G of t; and s 0 ¼ hl n+1 , v 0 i is such that its location l n+1 is the destination of the transition t, and its valuation v 0 ¼ A(v) is obtained by applying the assignments A of t to v. We then conclude that (s, s 0 ) belongs to r, the transition relation of t, and the equality ( §) is proved.
Finally, from ( §) and the induction hypothesis ( ‡) we obtain r ¼ r n r nÀ1 Á Á Á r 1 , i.e. the equality ( †) in Proposition 1, and the proof is done. PROPOSITION 2. An extended automaton has finitely many maximal syntactical macro-steps.
Proof. By Definition 7, a maximal syntactical macro-step s does not contain cycles of unstable locations. Thus, either s does not contain cycles at all (and there are finitely many such acyclic sequences of transitions in any given graph), or s contain a cycle that does include a stable location. Now, by Definition 1, the only stable locations on s are its first and last location. Hence, if s does contain a cycle with a stable location on it, then s itself is reduced to an elementary cycle (which that starts and ends in the same location), of which there are only finitely many in any given graph. PROPOSITION 3. Let E be an extended automaton and CollapseðEÞ its collapsed automaton. Then, a stable state is reachable in E if and only if it is also reachable in CollapseðEÞ.
Proof. ()) Assume that s is a stable state (i.e. s is of the form hl, vi where l is a stable location of E) that is reachable in E. We prove that s is also reachable in CollapseðEÞ. By definition, s is reachable if it is the last state of a run r of E. The proof is done by well-founded induction on the run r, where runs are ordered by the (strict) prefix relation.
For the base step, it is enough to note that the initial states of E and of CollapseðEÞ are the same. This is because the initial conditions of the two extended automata are the same, and so are the initial locations (the Collapse operation may at most remove unstable locations from an automaton, which, by definition, do not include the initial locations).
For the induction step, assume that the stable state s of E is not initial, and is the last state of some run r. Hence, there exists a strict prefix r 0 of the run r, such that: the last state s 1 of r 0 is stable; there exists a run fragment r 00 : s 1 , . . . , s n ¼ s between s 1 and s, which is a (semantical) macro-step.
By Definition 4 of a run fragment, there exists a sequence of transitions t 1 , . . . t nÀ1 such that, for i ¼ i, . . . , n À 1, (s i , s i+1 ) 2 r i , where r i denotes the transition relation of transition t i ; and, using again Definition 4 (semantical macro-step), the sequence s :
l n is a syntactical macro step, which is either of the following:
(i) A maximal syntactical macro-step. In this case, by Definition 8, the automaton Collapse (E) contains the transition t ¼ Collapse(s) which, by Proposition 1, has the transition relation r ¼ r nÀ1 r nÀ2 Á Á Á r 1 .
Hence, using Definition 6 of the composition of binary relations, we obtain (s 1 , s) 2 r. (ii) A non-maximal syntactical macro step. In this case, by Definition 8, the automaton Collapse (E) contains the whole syntactical macro-step s, which means that the semantics of Collapse(E) admits the semantical macro-step r 00 : s 1 , . . . , s n ¼ s. Proof. We prove that CollapseðEÞ 1 &P iff E 1 &P, and the proposition follows. We have (1): CollapseðEÞ 1 &P iff (2): there exists a state s that is reachable in CollapseðEÞ and violates P. Now, P is stable, i.e. it is of the form ðpc ¼ lÞ ) Q, for l a stable location of E. The fact that s violates P, is equivalent to s satisfies : P : pc ¼ l)^: Q, i.e. s has the form s ¼ hl‚ vi, for l a stable location of E, i.e. s is stable. Thus, (2) is equivalent to (3): there exists a stable state s that is reachable in CollapseðEÞ and violates P. By Proposition 2 above, (3) is then equivalent to (4): there exists a stable state s that is reachable in E and violates P; since P is stable, (4) is then equivalent to E 1 &P, and the proof is done. PROPOSITION 5. Let E 1 , E 2 be extended automata, t 1 a transition of E 1 , and t 2 a transition of E 2 . Let G 1 denote the guard of t 1 , l 1 denote the origin of t 1 , and A 1 , A 2 denote respectively the assignments of t 1 , t 2 . Then, t 2 is independent of t 1 in every reachable state of E 1 kE 2 if Proof. Let r be a run of E 1 kE 2 that terminates the stable state s. We prove that there exists a runr r of E 1 jE 2 that terminates in the state s as well. The proof is done by wellfounded induction on the length of the run r.
The base step is trivial, as the initial states of E 1 jE 2 and E 1 kE 2 are the same and are stable.
For the induction step, assume that the length of the run r is n ! 1, and let s 1 be a predecessor of s on the run r such that (i) the projection s 1 1 of s 1 on E 1 is stable, and (ii) there is no other state on r between s 1 and s whose projection on E 1 is stable.
If no strict predecessor s 1 of s on r satisfying the above conditions can be found, this means that E 1 has not made any move from the beginning (it has remained in its initial state). Thus, only E 2 has moved; this particular run of E 1 kE 2 is clearly also a run E 1 jE 2 as well, and the proof is done in this case.
Hence, we can assume that s 1 is a strict predecessor of s on the run r. Proof. By induction on the length of the runs of E 1 jE 2 . For the base step we just show that P holds initially, which is true by construction of E 1 jE 2 and by the fact that P holds in the initial states of both E 1 and E 2 .
For the induction step: assume that P holds in all states of all runs r of E 1 jE 2 of length n. Now, the run r leaves both E 1 and E 2 in a stable location, which, by Definition 13, means that both E 1 inithP‚ L ()) Assume that s is a stable state that is reachable in E 1 jE 2 . We prove that s is also reachable in CollapseðE 1 ÞjCollapseðE 2 Þ. By definition, s is reachable if it is the last state of a run r of E 1 jE 2 . The proof is done by wellfounded induction on the run r, where runs are ordered by the (strict) prefix relation.
For the base step, it is enough to note that the initial states of CollapseðE 1 ÞjCollapseðE 2 Þ and of E 1 jE 2 are the same. This is because the initial conditions of the two extended automata are the same, and so are the initial locations (the Collapse operation may at most remove unstable locations from an automaton, which do not include the initial locations).
For the induction step, assume that the stable state s of E 1 jE 2 is not initial, and is the last state of some run r. Hence, there exists a strict prefix r 0 of the run r, such that: the last state s 1 of r 0 is stable; there exists a run fragment r 00 s 1 , . . . ,s n ¼ s between s 1 and s, which is a semantical macro-step of E 1 jE 2 .
By the induction hypothesis, s 1 is also reachable in CollapseðE 1 ÞjCollapseðE 2 Þ. By definition of the atomic parallel composition, we obtain that either E 1 or E 2 move, by performing a semantical macro-step between s 1 and s, while the other one does not move. Now, 
